The legal conception of "religion"

I investigate the intersection of two of the most important areas governing how modern society is organized: the law governing religion. I investigate whether the purportedly (or presumptively) secular Western legal understanding of the idea of “religion,” as it is understood in court judgments, reflects any religious presuppositions or bias. In other words, to what extent is the idea of “religion,” as it is understood by courts, sectarian rather than secular? If a bias exists, what should be done about it in order to bring our understanding, our definitions, and our approach to legal issues involving religion into conformity with broader legal norms concerning formal equality? To investigate whether such a bias exists I begin by examining two sets of court decisions: one from the United Kingdom and one from Israel, discussing the question “who is a Jew?” in a legal context. I then discuss what the implications of those findings are, with particular regard to how “religion” as a legal term of art should be interpreted by courts. How should judicial interpretation of fundamental guarantees of religious freedom take account of the Christian provenance of the criteria governing what it means to be a religion in the first place?